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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDfroR's No'.--It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-DISTRICT COURT RULES--No. 12,257-

Halter vs. Wade-Decided December 31, 1928.
Facts.-Halter,a debtor under a judgment rendered by
the District Court of the City and County of Denver was, on
December 30, 1927, allowed sixty days for tendering a bill of
exceptions and no extension of time was iven. The bill was
tendered to the trial judge February 1 , 1928, but was not
lodged with the clerk of the Court until March 7, 1928. Notice of this lodging was served on counsel for defendant in
error March 24, 1928. A rule of the Denver District Court
requires that bill shall be lodged with the clerk immediately,
and shall forthwith notify the opposite party, or his attorney.
Wade has moved to strike the bill of exceptions.
Held.-The rule of the District Court has the force and
effect of a statute. It is not in conflict with any other rule or
law and must be observed. Plaintiff in error has not complied; the bill of exceptions must be stricken.
Motion to strike granted.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF DECREE-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-

No. 12,200-Walton vs. Walton-Decided March 4, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffbelow, defendant here, filed a complaint
praying for a divorce and charging defendant below with
cruelty and desertion. Defendant filed a cross complaint
charging the plaintiff with cruelty, and seeking a decree of
separate maintenance. Plaintiff withdrew his complaint; defendant amended her cross complaint to pray for an absolute
divorce. The case was heard as a non-contested matter and
an interlocutory decree was entered against the plaintiff in
favor of the defendant. More than six months later the defendant filed a motion to set aside the findings of fact and con-
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clusions of law, to which the plaintiff answered requesting
that the cause be set down for hearing and trial upon the terms
of alimony, and also praying that a decree of divorce be granted the defendant. The Court modified the property settlement and upon the plaintiff's application, entered a decree of
divorce in favor of the defendant, under Chapter 90 S.L. 1925.
Held.- l-The Court had jurisdiction to modify the
property settlement; 2-the Court erred in entering the decree
at the plaintiff's request and over the defendant's protest because (a) the legislature does not have power to require a
court of equity to grant a decree of divorce upon the application of the guilty party; (b) the act under which the decree
was entered is in violation of Article 3 of the State Constitution, and (c) the act of entering the decree is not merely a
matter of procedure; but even if it were, the legislature has
placed such matters under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by vesting it with power to make rules of practice and
procedure, (S.L. 1913, page 447, Chapter 121). Parsons vs.
Parsons, 70 Colorado 154, 198 Pacific is overruled.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
12,042 - Nikkel vs.
Lindhorst-DecidedMarch 11, 1929.
Facts.-Nikkel, a lawyer, obtained a loan of $80.00 from
Lindhorst's assignor, and filled in a blank note form so that
it provided for interest at 8% per annum to maturity, and
2% per month thereafter. When the note was not paid Lindhorst brought suit and Nikkel defended on the grounds of
usury under .C.L. 1921, Section 3797.
Held.-The provision for the alleged usurious interest
was inserted in the note by Nikkel fraudulently and without
the lender's knowledge. Nikkel is, therefore, estopped to
maintain his defense.
Judgment affirmed.
USURY-ESTOPPEL OF BORROWER-No.

CREDITOR'S BILL-MARSHALLING ASSETS-ATTORNEY'S FEES

12,017-Legge vs. Peterson-DecidedApril 15, 1929.
Facts.-Thisis an equitable action in the nature of a creditor's bill. Plaintiff below procured judgment against her
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tenant and after execution was returned unsatisfied brought
this action against tenant and bank. Court below marshalled
assets and allowed bank attorney's fees.
Held.- (1) Before the doctrine of marshalling assets will
be applied there must be two funds or properties at the time
the equitable relief is sought belonging to the common debtor
of both creditors on both of which funds one party has a claim
or lien and on one only of which the other party has a claim
or lien.
(2) Attorney's fees cannot be allowed on note in the absence of evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees and absence of evidence that holder of the note had incurred any
liability for or paid any attorney's fees.
(3) Cost of harvesting should have been charged one-half
to lessor and one-half to lessee.
(4) There is no evidence upon which fraud or conspiracy
could be predicated.
Judgment modified and affirmed.
12,113-Wilder
vs. The People-DecidedApril 29, 1929.
Facts.-Defendant below was convicted of violating the
liquor law on three counts, on the charge of possession, operation, and ownership of a still for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor.
Held.-Motion for change of venue properly denied.
Evidence of advice of counsel goes only to the question of intent on the charge of operating a still. The extent to which a
defendant testifying in his own behalf may give to the jury
his life's history, not directly connected with the charge, is
generally discretionary with the trial court. Verdict of the
jury on each count is supported by the evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-LIQUOR-EVIDENCE-No.

BILLS AND NOTES-INNOCENT PURCHASER-No.

12,139-

Stewart vs. Public Industrial Bank-Decided April 29,
1929.
Facts.-Public Industrial Bank recovered judgment
against Stewart on a promissory note acquired by the bank
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from the original payee before maturity. Claimed that note
was non-negotiable because it contained a clause authorizing
attorney to confess judgment.
Held.-Evidence sufficient to support finding that the
bank was a bona fide owner of the note, having purchased it
in due course. Inclusion in the note of the clause empowering
attorney to confess judgment did not render the note nonnegotiable.
Judgment affirmed.
BILLS AND

NOTES-FORECLOSURE-DENIAL

OF EXECUTION

COMPARISON OF WRITING--No. 12,109-Wilson vs. Scroggs
-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-This is a foreclosure suit. Defendant filed answer denying execution of note and denying consideration. At
trial plaintiff sought to introduce other notes and deeds of
defendant for comparison of signatures. This evidence was
denied by court below.
Held.-Court should have allowed the introduction of all
evidence which tended to establish the genuineness of the signatures offered as a basis of comparison; should have deter.mined, as a matter of law, whether or not that proof was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the defendant's signature
upon them; and if this was done to his satisfaction, should
have admitted the exhibits as standards of comparison to be
used by the experts as well as the jury.
Reversed and remanded.
PATENT RIGHTS-EQUITY-FORFEITURE-NO. 12,091-The
Operative Service Corporation vs. McIntyre Pump Company-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-McIntyre Pump Company, the owner of certain
patent rights, sold and assigned the patent rights to the defendant below with the exclusive right to manufacture on a
royalty basis. Contract provided for forfeiture in the event
of failure to manufacture and pay royalties. Defendant defaulted.
Held.-Courts of equity have jurisdiction to rescind and
cancel contracts where facts are established which clearly show
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that the injury caused by the breach is irreparable and that
damages are wholly inadequate.
Affirmed.
NON-SUIT-NEGLIGENCE-No. 12,074- Campbell
vs. Stamper Drug Company-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-Lower court directed verdict for the defendant.
Deceased went into drug store and called for quinine. The
clerk gave him strychnine, which caused his death.
Held.-Court below erred in holding that plaintiff and
deceased were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law in failing to determine that the bottle delivered by the
defendant's clerk contained strychnine instead of quinine.
Proof of the violation of the druggist's statute is sufficient to
make out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. The question of contributory negligence under the facts
and evidence was for the jury.
Reversed.
ACCIDENT INSURANCE - AGE - WARRANTY - No. 12,284Western Casualty Company vs. Aarons-Decided May 6,
1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffbelow, the assignee of Fannie M. Parker, had judgment against the Insurance Company for $120.00,
being the amount paid to defendant on account of premiums
for twelve years on an accident insurance policy. Parker, in
her application, represented she was fifty-four years old,
when in fact she was over sixty. She continued to pay premiums for twelve years. This suit was brought to recover
the premiums paid on the theory that by this misrepresentation in regard to her age the policy was void and she was
entitled to have the premiums returned.
Held.-The policy was voidable and not void. The company, having accepted the premiums over a period of years,
waived its right to avoid the policy. The insured, having
misrepresented her age but, nevertheless, for a period of
twelve years, having the benefit of the insurance policy, cannot assert that the policy was void and that she is entitled to
the premiums paid thereunder.
Judgment reversed.
DRUGS -

DICTA

12,040-In the Matter of
Adjudication of Priorities, etc. vs. The Arkansas Valley
Sugar Beet and Irrigated Land Company, et al-Decided
May 6, 1929.
Facts.-This is a review of a decree of the District Court
of Bent County rendered February 3, 1927, in a statutory proceeding for adjudicating water rights in water district, No.
17, Division No. 2, both for direct irrigation and storage. It
is the same Decree which was considered by this Court in
Holbrook District versus Fort Lyon Company, 84 Colorado
174. The records show that there have been several adjudications in this district. The court below reopened the Water
Right Decree on August 30, 1922, and entered a new decree.
Held.-The lower court had a right to reopen the decree.
Plaintiffs, in the action now under review, themselves had also
asked the trial court to reopen the earlier decree as the Holbrook District did. Therefore, Plaintiffs may not now complain of the very thing which they, themselves, asked to have
done. Priorities, as fixed by the court below, were proper.
Judgment affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-PRIORITIES--No.

BODY EXECUTION-TIME LIMIT-TIME OF CONFINEMENT-

No. 12,332-Roll vs. Davis-DecidedMay 13, 1929.
Facts.-Roll complains of the ruling of the trial court
denying his motion to quash and recall writ of body execution.
Body execution was issued two and one-half years after judgment, but during all of that time Roll was confined in the
penitentiary under a criminal charge.
Held.-Delay in issuing body execution was excusable
where the judgment debtor was confined in the penitentiary
during the entire period from the entry of the judgment to
the time of issuing execution. Body execution should not be
quashed because of imprisonment for another wrong. Where
the judgment was that Roll should be confined for a period
not to exceed one year, or until the further order of the court,
or until the amount of the judgment has been paid, such judgment is sufficiently definite. The Sheriff of the City and
County of Denver had the authority to take possession of
Roll's body in another county.
Judgment affirmed.
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EQUITY-FORECLOSURE-ACTION AT LAW-No. 12,321-The

Fairview Mining Corporation vs. American Mines &
Smelting Company-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-The grantors of American Mines & Smelting
Company gave to Allen Burris, the grantor of The Fairview
Mining Corporation, a mining lease and option to buy certain
properties. Under this option, various payments were made
and a number of extensions of time for payment were granted.
Aggregate payments of more than $85,000.00 were made.
Plaintiff below brought suit at law to recover possession of
the property.
Held.-The facts pleaded in the answer showed an equitable defense. The grantors in the contract retained title to
the property as security for payment of the agreed purchase
price. The relations between the parties are the same as if
title had passed from the grantor to the grantee, and the latter
had conveyed the title back as security for payment. Plaintiff was wrong in resorting to an action at law for the recovery
of possession. The plaintiff should have employed the equitable remedy of foreclosure and sale.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
FIRE INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILES--APPRAISAL

CLAUSE-No.

12,318-St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company vs.
The Walsenburg Land & Development Company - and
No. 12,319-The Sun Insurance Office vs. Tressler-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-These two cases were consolidated for trial. The
plaintiffs below each were owners of automobiles which were
insured by the defendants below against fire. Both automobiles were wholly destroyed in a fire. Because of failure of
the parties to agree on the damages, appraisers were appointed
under a provision in the policies, to appraise the loss. The
appraisers met and made an award without giving the plaintiffs below an opportunity to present any evidence as to the
value of the cars. Judgment below was for the plaintiffs below.
Held.-The attempted appraisal of the value of the property destroyed was a nullity by reason of the fact that the plain-
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tiffs were given no opportunity to appear before the board of
appraisers at the time the appraisement was made. Every man
has a right to be-heard before judgment. Of course, he may
waive that right, but the appraisal clause in these insurance
policies was not such a waiver of this right. In this case both
cars were totally destroyed; the appraiser had no knowledge
of their -value; and the owners of the cars should have been
given the opportunity of presenting evidence of the value.
Without such opportunity no hearing was had within the
meaning of the law.
Judgment affirmed.
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS-CHANGE OF PARTIES-DELAY-

No. 10,623-The Northern Colorado Irrigation Company
vs. The City and County of Denver DecidedMay 20,1929.
Facts.-This case was docketed in the Supreme Court six
years ago. Through stipulation of the parties for various continuances, but through no fault of the Court, the case was
unnecessarily delayed. In 1924 the plaintiff in error dismissed
the case, and in 1927 other parties moved to reinstate and reopen, which was granted. It appears that in the trial below
all claims presented were not determined.
Held.-That cause should be reversed because the court
below failed to determine all claims presented. The rights
of various water claimants have been seriously inconvenienced
by the long delays which are caused by counsel and not by this
court, and the court will enforce the rule that requests for
delays, even when accompanied by a stipulation, must show
sufficient reasons for extension of time.
Judgment reversed.
LANDS--No. 12,003-Pierce vs.
Marland Oil Company-Decided May 20, 1929.
Facts.-Pierceand McCall, plaintiffs below, brought action against Marland Oil Company of Colorado to recover
damages for alleged breach of contract, to which several defenses were interposed, one of which was that there was no
contract between the parties. The court below held that although extensive negotiations had been carried on, nevertheOIL-CONTRACTS--INDIAN
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less that there was no completed contract, and on this ground
granted a non-suit.
Held.-The evidence plainly shows there was no completed contract between the parties. Among other things, the
vendors were to assign to Marland Oil Company certain leases
they held on Indian Land. The evidence failed to show that
the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to such assignments
which was necessary in order to make a valid assignment had
been obtained. The vendors failed to show that they were in
a position to make the transfer.
Judgment affirmed.
12,306--The South
Denver Bank vs. The Guardian Trust Company-Decided
May 27, 1929.
Facts.-This was an action by The South Denver Bank
to recover from The Guardian Trust Company, as Administrator of the estate of Clarke, the possession of an automobile.
The court below sustained defendant's motion for non-suit.
The automobile was in possession of Clarke at the time of his
death. The defendant trust company qualified as administrator and took possession thereof and was in possession at the
time of the trial. A party by the name of Stanton gave a
chattel mortgage on this same automobile to The South Denver Bank to secure a loan of $1800.00. There was no evidence
to show that Stanton ever had title.
Held.-There was no evidence tending to show either
ownership or right of possession in Stanton or in The South
Denver Bank to this automobile.
Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-POSSESSION-TITLE-No.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY-INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE-No.

12,-

148-Osgood vs. The People-DecidedMay 27, 1929.
Held.-Mrs. Osgood was convicted of assault and battery
on an information in two counts, the first of which charged
the defendant and one Phillips with an assault with a deadly
weapon, and the second charging the defendant and Phillips
with assault and battery. Phillips, who was Mrs. Osgood's
chauffeur, engaged in a fist fight with another person in the

DICTA

country. Mrs. Osgood, becoming alarmed for her safety,
picked up a revolver that was in the car, got out of the car
and pointed the revolver at a bystander who was not engaged
in the fight. The bystander told her he had nothing to do
with it, whereupon she expressed regret and apologized. She
is not convicted for assault upon the bystander, but for assault
upon the person who was fighting with Phillips.
Held.-There was no evidence justifying such a conviction. The defendant did exactly what any prudent and reasonable person would have done under all the circumstances
of the case, and when she discovered her mistake, she explained her actions and promptly apologized.
Judgment reversed.
CONTRACTS-REAL
CEPTANCE-No.

ESTATE-UNILATERAL

12,142-

CONTRACT -

Ac-

Morath vs. Perkins-Decided

May 27, 1929.
Facts.-Morath,a real estate salesman, sued Perkins and
wife to recover judgment of $38,000.00, as damages for the
failure of defendant to carry out the provisions of an alleged
contract for the sale of defendant's real estate to plaintiff. The
Court below directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground
that the alleged contract in question was an offer to sell and
that it had not been accepted by the plaintiff.
Held.-I. The contract involved was merely an offer to
sell and was unilateral.
2. The evidence was not sufficient to show an acceptance.
Judgment affirmed.
FORECLOSURE-LACHES----No. 12,240-Conrad vs. Scott--De-

cided May 27, 1929.
Facts.-Conradsued Scott to foreclose the lien of a Deed
of Trust dated February 1, 1888, and given to secure the payment of a note of $300.00 of even date, payable in five years.
Among the defenses was that of laches. The court below held
Conrad guilty of laches and dismissed the suit.
Held.-Lapse of time is an important element of laches.
Yet, unless a case falls within the operation of the Statute of
Limitations, there is no such period within which a person
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not laches. Scott purchased the property subject to the Deed
of Trust and had paid no part of the principal or interest of
the note secured thereby. To hold that Conrad cannot be permitted to foreclosure the lien of the Deed of Trust would
operate to cancel a just debt which Scott should pay.
Judgment reversed.
DEEDS-REFORMATION-SUBSEQUENT GRANTEE-No. 12,117
-Waters vs. Massey-HarrisHarvester Company-Decided May 27, 1929.
Facts.-The Harvester Company, a judgment creditor of
Waters, sued Waters and his wife to reform a deed executed
by the latter to her husband so as to include the property intended to be conveyed, instead of that described in the deed.
The erroneous description arose through a mutual mistake of
the parties thereto. A demurrer was overruled and defendant
elected to stand upon the demurrer. The Harvester Company
was not a party to the deed.
Held.-Since the grantee of a grantee in a deed containing a misdescription caused by mutual mistake cannot maintain an action to reform the deed, merely because he is a
grantee neither can a judgment creditor.
Judgment reversed.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-RISKS COVERED BY INSURANCE

POLICY-No. 12,114-Smart, et al, vs. Radetsky-Decided
May 27, 1929.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission awarded compensation to Smart and one other against Radetsky and the insurance
company. It was claimed below that the risk was not covered
by the insurance policy. The insurance policy was issued for
a junk dealer, but provided the general coverage for other
business operations. The employees were injured in dismantling a sugar plant and not upon work carried on by a junk
dealer.
Held.-The insured had been engaged in dismantling
abandoned plants for years to the knowledge of the insurance
company. Dealing in old machinery constitutes second-hand
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machinery business and not junk business, and, therefore, the
clause in the policy under the heading of other business operations would cover this vocation.
Judgment affirmed.
ROADS-PRIVATE WAY-RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY-No. 12,072-The Denver & Salt Lake Railway Company vs. The
Pacific Lumber Company-Decided May 27, 1929.
Facts-This was an action by The Pacific Lumber Company against the railroad company to restrain the defendant
railroad company from interfering with plaintiff's use of a
private crossing over the defendant's railroad track where it
passes across the plaintiff's patented land. The railroad rightof-way was acquired from the United States before any patent
was issued to the plaintiff or his grantors for this land. The
lower court entered an order prohibiting any interference by
the railroad company with the plaintiff's use of the crossing.
Held-The right-of-way granted the railroad company
by Act of Congress was more than a mere easement. It
amounts to a qualified or limited fee, and so long as defendant
railway company maintains its line of road it has the right of
exclusive use and possession of its right-of-way. This not being a public highway crossing, the plaintiff acquired no right
in the private crossing by estoppel.
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER

-CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE

-

No. 12,327-Ives vs. The People-DecidedJune 3, 1929.
Facts.-Ives was found guilty of murder in the first degree and the jury fixed the penalty of death. Judgment was
pronounced in accordance with the verdict.
Held.-l. The evidence was not circumstantial. Under
our statutes the death penalty could be fixed for the commission of a crime.
2. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
3. The newly discovered evidence was not sufficient to
warrant the granting of a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
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PROMISSORY NOTE-COGNOVIT-DEFAULT JUDGMENT-No.

12,092-Peterson vs. Vanderlip-DecidedJune 3, 1929.
Facts.-Action was brought to set aside and vacate a former judgment on a cognovit note where there was no service
of summons, and the defendant did not appear at the trial in
person or by an attorney of his own selection, and an attorney,
not the defendant's attorney, appeared and confessed judgment in the principal of the note and interest then due. The
note had already been paid before suit was brought on it.
Held.-The note, having been paid before this action was
instituted, the conduct of the plaintiff in bringing suit upon
the note and obtaining judgment was a fraud upon the court
and its jurisdiction, and a willful abuse of legal process to
accomplish an unworthy and illegal end. The judgment was
unjust and should be vacated and set aside.
Judgment affirmed.
REPLEVIN-BURDEN OF PROOF-No. 12,102-McAlpine vs.

McAlpine-Decided June 3, 1929.
Facts.-McAlpine sued her former daughter-in-law, McAlpine, to recover several articles of jewelry. The case was
tried to the court without a jury. The findings and judgment
were for the defendant.
Held.-I. The evidence was sufficient to support the findings and judgment.
2. The burden of proof was properly placed upon the
plaintiff. Defendant's claim that the jewelry was given by
the plaintiff to her son, and by the son to the defendant as a
wedding present, is not an affirmative defense.
Judgment affirmed.
Loss -INTEREST - No.
12,1S8-LeZotte vs. Bank of Del Norte-Decided June 3,
1929.

BANKS-CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT-

Fact.-In 1921 Mrs. Comstock deposited with the Bank

of Del Norte the sum of $3535.00 and received the bank's certificate of deposit therefor, due in ninety days with .interest
at 4% per annum, but no interest was to accrue or to be paid

after maturity. After the maturity of the certificate in 1921,
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Mrs. Comstock met her death in a sleeping car and her personal effects which she had with her were burned. The certificate of deposit was lost or destroyed.
Held.-The bank is liable for the amount of the certificate of deposit with interest to date of maturity, but is not
liable for interest after maturity. The Statute of Limitations
having run against the certificate, it was not necessary to give
an indemnity bond to the bank.
Judgment affirmed.
RECEIVER - No. 12,090-Stevens vs. Realty
Loan & Finance Company-Decided June 3, 1929.
Facts.-A deed, absolute in form, was given by defendant
below to plaintiff below, to secure the payment of a debt. The
deed was in fact a mortgage. The deed conveyed the property
together with the rents, issues and profits thereof. The property being insufficient in value to discharge the encumbrances
against it and the defendant insolvent, the court below appointed a receiver.
Held.-Evidence sufficient to justify the appointment of
a receiver.
Judgment affirmed.
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